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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RACE SEGREGA-
TION ORDINANCES.
The validity of a race segregation ordinance enacted by the City
of Louisville was sustained by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
in a recent case (Harris v. City of Louisville, 177 S. W. 472).
Because of the fact that such ordinances have usually been held
invalid we give the important sections of the present ordinance in
full:
Section I. "It shall be unlawful for any colored person to move
into and occupy as a residence, place of abode, or to establish and
maintain as a place of public assembly any house upon any block
upon which a greater number of houses are occupied as residences,
places of abode or places of public assembly, by white people than
are occupied as residences, places of abode or places of public assem-
bly by colored people."
Section II. "It shall be unlawful for any white person to move
into and occupy as a residence, place of abode or to establish and
maintain as a place of public assembly, any house upon any block
upon which a greater number of houses are occupied as residences,
places of abode or places of public assembly by colored people than
are occupied as residences, places of abode or places of public assem-
bly by white people."
Section III. "The word block as the same is used in. this ordi-
nance shall be construed to mean," etc.
Section IV. "Nothing in this ordinance shall affect the location
of residences, places of abode or places of public assembly made
previous to the approval of this ordinance, and nothing herein shall
be so construed as to prevent the occupation of residences, places of
abode or places of public assembly by white or colored servants or
employes of occupants of such residences, places of abode or places
of public assembly on the block on which they are so employed; nor
shall anything 'herein contained be construed to prevent any person
who, at the date of the passage of, this ordinance, shall have acquired
or possessed the right to occupy any building as a residence, place
of abode or place of public assembly, from exercising this right.
Nor shall anything herein contained prevent the owner of any build-
ing now leased, rented or occupied as a residence, place of abode or
place of public assembly for colored persons, from continuing to rent,
lease or occupy such residence, place of abode or place of public
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assembly for such persons, if the owner shall so desire; but, if such
house should, after the passage of this act, be at any time leased,
rented or occupied as a residence, place of abode or place of public
assembly for white persons, it shall not thereafter be used for col-
ored persons, if such occupation would then be a violation of Section
I hereof. Nor shall anything herein contained prevent the owner
of any building now leased, rented or occupied as a residence, place
of abode or place of public assembly for white persons, from con-
tinuing to rent, lease or occupy such residence, place of abode or
place of assembly for such purpose, if the ownershall so desire;
but if such house should, after the passage of this act, be at any time
leased, rented or occupied as a residence, place of abode or place of
assembly for colored persons, it shall not be thereafter so used for
white persons, if such occupation would then be a violation of Sec-
tion II hereof."
While it is true that such an ordinance could not be upheld con-
stitutionally, if it operated to take away vested property rights, as
it would violate the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution, it is
equally clear that such vested property rights are subject to a reason-
able regulation by the state when the object sought to be effected
by such regulation is the preservation of the peace, public health or
public morals. The fourteenth amendment cannot be construed as
designing to take away the right to a reasonable exercise of the
police power.1
We then come to the question of what is a reasonable exercise
of the police power in this respect. An examination of the statutes
and decisions on the subject of race segregation in schools and public
conveyances leads to the inevitable conclusion that segregation with
reference to schools and public conveyances is a valid and reasonable
exercise of the police power in view of the object sought to be
obtained thereby. It would seem that an ordinance providing for
segregation of the races with reference to residence should be
construed as equally reasonable when its fundamental purpose is
to prevent breaches of the peace, immorality and danger to health,
resulting from too close an association of the races. This purpose
is unequivocally set forth in the title to the ordinance involved in
the principle case.2
1State v. Gurry, 47 L. 1. A. N. S. 1087.
2
"An ordinance to prevent conflict and ill feeling between the white and
colored races in the city of Louisville, and to preserve the public peace, and
to promote the general welfare by making reasonable provisions requiring,
as far as practicable, the use of separate blocks for residences, places of
abode and places of assembly by white and colored people respectively."
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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW.
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recently sustained a
precisely similar ordinance 3 in a consolidated case involving segre-
gation ordinances of the cities of Richmond and Ashland. The
question has also been passed upon in North Carolina,4 Maryland,5
and Georgia.8 The ordinances in the three latter states were re-
jected, but the courts did not deny the power of municipal corpora-
tions to enact such ordinances where they do not exclude vested
rights but merely restrict them. The Louisville ordinance, supra,
does not take away the vested right of alienation but merely restricts
the alienation to certain classes, and is, therefore, not a violation of
the Constitution.
The further objection that such an ordinance is a discrimination
against an inferior race cannot be sustained in the absence of any-
thing found in the act itself placing that construction upon it. The
Supreme Court of the United States supports this view.7  The
language of Justice Brown is that "Laws permitting and even re-
quiring their separation in places where they are liable to be brought
into contact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race
to the other, and have been generally if not universally recognized
as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise
of their police powers." The Constitution does not attempt to guar-
antee social equality but merely political equality of the two races.
3Hopkins v. City of Richmond; and Coleman v. Town of Ashland; 88
S. R. 139.4State v. Darnell, 81 S. B. 338.5State v. Gurry, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1087.
OCarey v. City of Atlanta, 84 S. R. 456.7 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537.
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